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This paper examines whether the Sub-Saharan African economies could gain from multilateral trade 
reform in the presence of trade preferences. The World Bank’s LINKAGE model of the global 
economy is employed to examine the impact first of current trade barriers and agricultural subsidies, 
and then of possible outcomes from the WTO’s Doha round. The results suggest moving to free 
global merchandise trade would boost real incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa proportionately more than 
in other developing countries or in high-income countries, despite a terms of trade loss in parts of the 
region. Farm employment and output, the real value of agricultural and food exports, the real returns 
to farm land and unskilled labor, and real net farm incomes would all rise in the region, thereby 
alleviating poverty. Results for a Doha partial liberalization of both agricultural and non-agricultural 
trade take the region only a small part of the way towards those desirable outcomes. 
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According to Chen and Ravallion (2004), Africa now accounts for one-third of the world’s 
people living on less than $1 a day (up from one-tenth two decades ago). The vast majority of those 
people are dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, and for much of the food they eat. Raising 
agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is one possible way to alleviate people’s 
poverty.
1 Another possibility is through cuts to agricultural (and textile) protection in rich countries, 
for example via the World Trade Organization’s Doha Development Agenda. While a 
comprehensive multilateral trade reform should boost economic growth and thereby reduce poverty 
in general,
2 Panagariya (2004) has questioned whether this applies to SSA countries in particular. 
He cites two reasons. One is that those countries that are net importers of food would face higher 
                                                 
1   On prospects for doing that using new biotechnologies, see Anderson and Jackson (2005).  
2    For recent reviews of the literature on the links between trade liberalization, economic growth and poverty 
alleviation, see for example Winters (2002, 2004), Winters, McCulloch and McKay (2004), Dollar and Kraay 
(2004), Anderson (2004) and DTI (2004). Rodrigeuz and Rodrik (2001) examine a number of studies linking trade 
and growth and claim the results they surveyed are not robust. However, in a more recent study that revisits the 
Sachs and Warner (1995) data and then provides new time-series evidence, Wacziarg and Welch (2003) show that 
dates of trade liberalization do characterize breaks in investment and GDP growth rates. Specifically, for the 1950-
1998 period, countries that have liberalized their trade (raising their trade-to-GDP ratio by an average of 5 
percentage points) have enjoyed on average 1.5 percentage points higher GDP growth compared with their pre-








food import prices. The other is that those countries that are net exporters of farm (and textile) 
products already enjoy duty-free access to the key markets of Europe and North America under 
various trade preference arrangements, so cuts to most-favoured-nation (MFN) import tariffs by rich 
countries would erode SSA preference margins. Either way, SSA economies could be worse off. A 
third possible way in which SSA terms of trade could deteriorate is through export expansion of a 
small number of similar products following the region’s own trade liberalization, should it choose to 
participate in a multilateral reform. 
This paper seeks to address the empirical question implicit in that critique. It does so using 
the World Bank’s LINKAGE model of the global economy and its new global trade and protection 
database that explicitly includes, for the first time, the non-reciprocal tariff preferences enjoyed by 
developing and especially least developed countries, including in SSA. The model is employed to 
examine the impact on markets, welfare and poverty in SSA first of current agricultural trade 
distortions and subsidies and then also non-agricultural trade distortions, before analyzing possible 
outcomes from the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations that are currently under way 
among members of the World Trade Organization (WTO).  
The next section of the paper provides details of the recursive LINKAGE model and database. 
Section 3 presents results showing the effects of removing all current protection and subsidies as 
estimated by the LINKAGE model. (In the Appendix the results are compared with those from a 
comparative static version similar to the GTAP model, to show how key model specifications can 
affect the results.) While global free trade is not expected in the foreseeable future, it provides a 
benchmark against which to consider partial reforms. Section 4 describes one ongoing reform effort, 








presented in Section 5 for a number of possible DDA scenarios in which least developed countries 
may choose to participate. Some caveats are discussed in Section 6 before the final section 
summarizes the findings and draws out their policy implications for SSA. 
 
2. The global LINKAGE model and protection database 
 
The model used for this analysis is the World Bank’s global computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model known as LINKAGE (van der Mensbrugghe 2004). It is a relatively straightforward 
CGE model but with some characteristics that distinguish it from standard comparative static 
models such as the GTAP model (see Hertel 1997). A key difference is that it is recursive dynamic, 
so while it starts with 2001 as its base year it can be solved annually through to 2015. The dynamics 
are driven by exogenous population and labor supply growth, savings-driven capital accumulation, 
and labor-augmenting technological progress (as assumed for the World Bank’s global economic 
prospects exercise, see World Bank 2004). In any given year, factor stocks are fixed. Producers 
minimize costs subject to constant returns to scale production technology, consumers maximize 
utility, and all markets – including for labor
3 – are cleared with flexible prices. There are three types 
of production structures. Crop sectors reflect the substitution possibility between extensive and 
intensive farming. Livestock sectors reflect the substitution possibility between ranch versus range 
feeding. And all other sectors reflect the standard capital/labor substitution (with two types of labor: 
skilled and unskilled). There is a single representative household per modeled region, allocating 
income to consumption using the extended linear expenditure system. Trade is modeled using a 
                                                 
3    The results would be different if unemployment was present and changed as a consequence of the shocks 








nested Armington structure in which aggregate import demand is the outcome of allocating 
domestic absorption between domestic goods and aggregate imports, and then aggregate import 
demand is allocated across source countries to determine bilateral trade flows. 
There are six sources of protection in the model. The most important involves bilateral 
import tariffs. There are also bilateral export subsidies, plus domestic production subsidies in 
agriculture which may apply to intermediate goods, outputs, and payments to capital and land. 
Three closure rules are used. First, government fiscal balances are fixed in any given year.
4 
The fiscal objective is met by changing the level of lump sum taxes on households. This implies 
that losses of tariff revenues are replaced by higher direct taxes on households. Second, the current 
account balance is fixed. Given that other external financial flows are fixed, this implies that ex ante 
changes to the trade balance are reflected in ex post changes to the real exchange rate. For example, 
if import tariffs are reduced, the propensity to import increases. Additional imports are financed by 
increasing export revenues, typically achieved by a real exchange rate depreciation. Finally, 
investment is driven by savings. With fixed public and foreign saving, investment will be affected 
by two factors: changes in the savings behavior of households, and changes in the unit cost of 
investment. The latter can play an important role in a dynamic model if imported capital goods are 
taxed. Because the capital account is exogenous, rates of return across countries can differ over time 
and across simulations. The model only solves for relative prices. The numéraire in the model, or 
                                                 
4  For the sake of simplicity they are fixed in US$ terms at their base year level, minimizing potential sustainability 








price anchor, is the export price index of manufactured exports from high-income countries.
5 This 
price is fixed at unity in the base year and throughout the projection period to 2015. 
The newest version of the LINKAGE model, Version 6.0, incorporates the latest release of the 
GTAP dataset, Release 6.0.
6 Compared with Version 5 of the GTAP dataset, Version 6 has a 2001 
base year instead of 1997, updated national and trade data and, importantly, a new source for the 
protection data. The new protection data come from a joint CEPII (Paris)/ITC (Geneva) project. The 
product of this effort, known as MAcMaps, is a tariff level detailed database on bilateral protection 
that integrates trade preferences, specific tariffs and a partial evaluation of non-tariff barriers, for 
example tariff rate quotas (TRQs).
7 The new GTAP database has lower tariffs than the previous 
Version 5 database because of the inclusion of bilateral trade preferences and of major reforms 
between 1997 and 2001 such as continued implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements and 
China’s progress towards WTO accession (which contributed to the ratio of global exports plus 
imports-to-GDP rising from 44 to 46 percent over those four years). 
The main source of trade distortion resides in tariffs or border barriers, although some 
countries – particularly high-income countries – also have significant agricultural production and 
export subsidies which are included in the database. The average import tariff for agriculture and 
                                                 
5    Throughout, the term ‘high-income countries’ refers to OECD countries (other than Mexico) plus the newly 
acceded members of the EU25, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. The term ‘developing countries’ refers to the 
rest of the world. 
6   The Global Trade Analysis Project, otherwise known as GTAP, is an international consortium of trade researchers 
from universities, research institutions and national and international agencies. It is based at Purdue University. The 
GTAP Center provides four key resources to the trade community. First and foremost is an integrated and 
consistent international database for trade policy analysis. The current version is composed of 87 country/region 
groupings and 57 economic sectors. The second is a publicly available global trade model, known as the GTAP 
model. (N.B. The LINKAGE model is distinct from the GTAP model though it uses the same underlying database.) 
The third is an annual course in applied trade modeling. And finally, GTAP organizes and co-hosts the annual 
Conference on Global Economic Analysis. More information on the GTAP Center and project can be found at 
http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu. 









food is 16 percent for high-income countries and 18 percent for developing countries, while for 
manufactures other than textiles and clothing it is 8 percent for developing countries and just 1.3 
percent for high-income countries (Table 1). The averages, however, obscure large variations across 
countries, commodities and bilateral trades. For example, thanks to tariff preferences, exporters in 
Sub-Saharan Africa face slightly lower tariffs than do exporters elsewhere (compare columns 1 and 
2 of Table 1). That table also shows that tariffs are very high in SSA, especially when South Africa 
is separated out.  
The GTAP database provides country detail for just nine SSA countries. Besides South 
Africa (which accounted for 36 percent of Sub-Saharan African GDP in 2001), there are other eight 
but together they comprise only 14 percent of Sub-Saharan African GDP so we have aggregated 
then into a group referred to here as ‘Other Southern Africa’. It comprises Botswana, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe and (even though it is in central Africa) 
Uganda. Unfortunately the Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, which accounts for half of the region’s 
GDP, is not yet disaggregated in the GTAP model and so has to be examined as just one large sub-
region. 
 
3. Market and welfare impacts of current protection policies 
 
The LINKAGE model provides a baseline projection of the world economy first from 2001 to 
2005 (following accession to WTO by China and Taiwan, EU expansion eastwards which added ten 








2004) and then to 2015 assuming no other policy changes. Deviations from that baseline in 2015, 
due to phased partial or total liberalization from 2005, are then examined. 
Full liberalization of merchandise trade over the 2005-2010 period leads to global gains by 
2015 of $287 billion per year, according to the LINKAGE model.
8 This provides an important 
benchmark against which to measure the benefits of future partial trade reforms. Another is the 
reforms incorporated in our pre-simulation experiment for the period from 2001 to 2004, due to the 
final-stage of the phase-out of the MFA, the accession of China and Taiwan to the WTO, and the 
eastern enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 members. The impacts of those reforms on import 
tariffs are non-trivial: had those three reforms not been implemented, the dynamic gains in 2015 
from freeing global merchandise trade would have been $350 billion instead of $287 billion, or an 
extra $63 billion annually. Fully $33 billion of that is due to the removal of MFA quotas and hence 
should be considered part of the Uruguay Round’s legacy – assuming safeguards by high-income 
countries or export taxes by China do not replace textile and clothing quotas after the end-2004 
phase-out. 
Table 2 reports the distribution of the standard economic welfare or real income (equivalent 
variation) effects by 2015 of removing all merchandise (though not services) trade barriers and 
agricultural subsidies globally between 2005 and 2010. As already mentioned, removing those 
distortionary policies would generate $287 billion in additional income in 2015, with two-thirds of 
that global gain accruing to the high-income countries. However, as a share of income, developing 
countries would do somewhat better, with an average increase of 0.8  percent compared to 
                                                 
8   This is very much larger than the $84 billion generated by Hertel and Keeney (2005) using a new version of the 








0.6  percent for high-income countries. And Sub-Saharan Africa would do even better than the 
developing country average, enjoying a 1.1 percent income boost.  
The numbers in parentheses in Table 2 show the amount of that welfare cost due to the 
effect on the international terms of trade for each country. For developing countries as a group the 
terms of trade effect is negative. It is positive for South Africa and Other Southern Africa, but 
negative for Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa. That is, as presumed by Panagariya (2004) and others, 
current trade distortions do improve the terms of trade for some developing countries, but evidently 
not for the countries of southern Africa. Notice also that the Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa would 
enjoy an even larger proportional increase than southern Africa in the volume of its trade if all 
barriers were removed globally (final column of Table 2). 
To better understand the forces behind those welfare changes, it is helpful to look at the 
changing sectoral pattern of trade and to decomposes the terms of trade change for each of the three 
sub-regions of SSA into export and import price changes for all merchandise, and also for just food 
and agricultural products. In 2001 each of those three sub-regions was a very slight net exporter of 
food and agricultural products. Our base projection to 2015 shows little change for South Africa but 
the other two emerge as slightly greater net exporters of farm products assuming no further trade 
policy changes, and a little more so if there were to be full liberalization of merchandise trade 
globally over the next few years (Table 3). Since such a liberalization increases international prices 
for farm relative to non-farm products, that alone might lead one to be unsurprised that the three 
sub-regions are estimated to be net beneficiaries of a move to free trade, were it not for the 








A decomposition of the terms of trade is reported in Table 4. It reveals that the sub-regions’ 
import prices rise for food and agricultural products and decline for other merchandise, as expected. 
This leads to a decline in the volume of farm imports such that the value of those imports hardly 
changes. But Table 4 also shows a decrease in farm and other merchandise export prices except for 
Other Southern Africa – a reflection in part of the erosion of preferences. 
To assess the impacts of developing country liberalization versus high-income country 
liberalization in different economic sectors, the global welfare results are decomposed in Table 5. 
They suggest liberalization of agriculture and food markets yield 63 percent of the total global gains 
(similar to Hertel and Keeney’s 66 percent). This is consistent with the high tariffs in agriculture 
versus other sectors, but is nonetheless remarkable given the low shares of agriculture in global 
GDP (4 percent) and global merchandise trade (9 percent). Nearly half (44 percent) of those gains 
are accounted for by the farm policies of high-income countries, but notice that as much of the gain 
to developing countries from farm reform is due to South-South agricultural liberalization as to 
increased access to high-income country markets (around $26 billion). Almost the same is true for 
liberalizing trade in manufactures, which means reform by developing countries is as important in 
terms of economic welfare gains to the South as reform by high-income countries. The final column 
of Table 5 shows the welfare gains just for Sub-Saharan Africa. From those shares it is clear that 
agricultural reform in high-income countries is even more important to that region than to other 
developing countries, while textiles and clothing are relatively less important. 
How would that full liberalization alter the real value of food and agricultural output and 
exports for SSA? Table 6 shows that real food and agricultural output and export values – even net 








trade. When disaggregated that remains true for the three sub-regions, except for the Rest of SSA’s 
real value of food output which would be lower by 2015 than in the baseline, although only by 1 
percent. Its food exports are higher even though food output is down because the higher price of 
importable food (see Table 4) has discouraged domestic sales there.  
Of importance from a poverty viewpoint is real net farm incomes, and they would be greater 
for all three sub-regions, by between 8 and 16 percent (final column of Table 6). That suggests the 
effect on income of the rise in the price of importable farm and food products dominates the effect 
of the (smaller) fall in the price of exportables that was mentioned earlier (Table 4). 
In volume terms, leaving aside processed food and looking just at agricultural output and 
employment on farms, that would grow faster in all three sub-regions of SSA over the next decade 
if all merchandise trade were freed (columns 1 and 2 of Table 7). So it is just in the processed food 
industry that output would be lower in Rest of SSA, not in farming. 
If all merchandise were to be freed, then over the next decade the share of agriculture in the 
GDP of SSA would not decline, as it otherwise would have done, and the share of the sector’s 
output that is exported would rise by much more than otherwise (Table 8).  
Of particular interest to SSA cotton exporters is the impact of the removal of cotton 
subsidies (which raise producer prices by more than 50 percent in the US and even more in the EU) 
in this context of freeing all merchandise trade and agricultural subsidies.
9 The model results 
suggest the price of cotton in international markets would be considerably higher in 2015, including 
for US exports because its subsidies would no longer depress that price. The price rise would not 
apply equally to all exporters however, because of product differentiation as captured in the 
                                                 
9   For more on the cotton subsidy issue, see Baffes (2005). The initiative to include cotton as an explicit item on the 
Doha Development Agenda, following demands by four West African cotton-exporting nations, is discussed in 








Armington elasticities. For Brazil and Australia, the rise is 8 percent, while for Sub-Saharan Africa 
it averages less than 2 percent (relative to the numéraire, which is the average price of exports of 
manufactures by high-income countries). However, cotton exports from Sub-Saharan Africa would 
be a huge 75 percent larger under this full reform scenario. The share of all developing countries in 
global exports would be 85 percent instead of 56 percent in 2015, vindicating the efforts by African 
cotton-exporting countries to ensure cotton receives specific attention in the Doha negotiations.  
The relatively small percentage changes in net national economic welfare reported in Table 
2 (less than 2 percent) hide the fact that redistributions of welfare among groups within each 
country following a trade reform can be much larger. This is clear from the impacts on real rewards 
to labor, capital and land that are reported in Table 9. The results strongly support the expectation 
from trade theory that real returns to farm land and unskilled labor would rise substantially in 
capital-scare SSA countries, and by more than wages of skilled workers, which in turn rise more 
than earnings of capitalists (Table 9). This means the number of jobs would grow faster for 
unskilled workers in the region.
10 Given that more than two-thirds of SSA households are heavily 
dependent on agriculture for their livelihood, and that they and other unskilled laborers make up 
most of the people in poverty, this reform would improve equity and reduce poverty in all three sub-
regions of SSA.  
In summary, the above results for full merchandise trade liberalization suggest that, despite 
preference erosion, the SSA economy – and especially the poor within the region -- is harmed by 
current trade distortions. The next question to be addressed is: will the same be true of the smaller 
changes that would result from partial reforms of the sort being negotiated currently under the Doha 
                                                 
10   Had we specified some under-employment of unskilled workers instead of their full employment, this boost to their 
demand would have manifest itself in fewer unemployed and less as a wage rise – which possibly would reduce 








Development Agenda? That cannot be assumed, because the signs of the effects depend on, among 
other things, which sectors and which countries participate in the reform, how large the bound 
tariffs that are to be lowered are above applied rates, and the distribution of tariff preferences. To 
explore that issue further, attention now turns to the effects of some prospective Doha scenarios. 
 
4. The Doha negotiations 
 
To what extent are reform commitments likely to emerge from the Doha round? WTO trade 
negotiators focus on reductions not to the actual farm subsidies and the applied tariffs shown in 
Table 1 but rather to members’ legally bound import tariffs, export subsidies and domestic support 
commitments. These are higher than applied rates in nearly all countries, but especially so in 
agriculture and particularly in poorer countries, as shown in Table 10. Hence if cuts to bound rates 
are sufficiently small, or the gap between bound and applied rates sufficiently large, no actual 
reform need take place from an agreed set of bound rate reductions.  
The Doha round was launched in late 2001, but the following Trade Ministerial meeting, in 
Cancun in September 2003, ended with acrimony and without an agreement on how to proceed. At 
Cancun developing countries made it abundantly clear that further progress would not be possible 
without a commitment by high-income countries to significantly lower their import barriers and 
agricultural subsidies (including importantly for cotton). An intense period of consultations in July 
2004 ended with a Decision on how the Doha Work Programme should proceed (WTO 2004). The 
so-called July Framework Agreement that emerged from that Decision reiterates the importance of 








key to that. In its Annexes, the Decision provides guidance as to how a Doha agreement might be 
structured, with frameworks for establishing modalities for agriculture and for non-agricultural 
market access, and for negotiations on trade facilitation, as well as providing recommendations for 
trade in services. We begin by summarizing what emerged with respect to the three agricultural 
pillars. 
 
Agricultural market access 
Jean, Laborde and Martin (2005) examine the consequences of different tariff-cutting 
formulae, bearing in mind the existing tariff rate quotas, the prevalence of tariff preferences for 
developing countries, the need to accommodate ‘Sensitive’ products, and the Special and 
Differential Treatment demanded by developing countries including provisions for ‘Special’ farm 
products. For this study, tariff cutting is implemented at the 6-digit HS commodity level and 
involves a detailed comparison of each country's bound tariffs, which are what negotiators focus on, 
with the applied tariffs on a given bilateral trade flow, which are what modelers need to deal with. 
The gap between bound and applied tariffs is the so-called binding overhang, and it can 
significantly blunt the impact of any negotiated outcome. Indeed in some scenarios, countries are 
not required to change their applied tariffs at all. Once the detailed tariff analysis was conducted, 
the results were aggregated up to the LINKAGE model’s regions and sector levels by the CEPII staff 
in Paris (with special thanks to David Laborde). Note that the applied tariff cuts vary not only by 
sector, but also by trading partner – and may involve smaller or zero cuts on imports from those 








Jean et al. evaluate the consequences for 2001 applied rates of different approaches to 
liberalization, and particularly different degrees of top-down progressivity in the bound tariff cuts, 
as well as different degrees of Special and Differential Treatment in the extent of reform for 
developing as compared with developed countries.
11 They look first at a proposal similar to the 
Harbinson progressive or tiered reduction formula (see WTO 2003b), but find that set of cuts would 
lead to very little import liberalization, because bound tariffs in many countries exceed applied rates 
by such large margins. As a result, Jean et al. focus on a set of reforms that involve cuts in applied 
agricultural protection rates that are at least 10 percentage points greater than in the Harbinson 
proposal.
12 It yields an average cut in applied agricultural tariffs of about one-third globally in each 
of the scenarios we consider below.  
 
Agricultural domestic support 
Reductions in domestic support have been a particular concern of developing countries. This 
reflects the fact that the high-income countries are the major providers of such assistance, and many 
developing countries are concerned about the ability of their producers to compete with high-
income country producers receiving large amounts of domestic support. While the marked 
asymmetry between high-income and developing countries is a concern, there is evidence, from 
Hertel and Keeney (2005) and from Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga (2004), that the benefits to 
developing countries from reductions in domestic support are very minor compared with the 
                                                 
11   They assume that (as suggested in the Girard Text – see WTO 2003a) in the absence of a bound tariff on a good it 
is set at double the applied MFN rate. 
12   They also explore a simple proportional cut formula that brings about the same reduction in average tariffs in high-
income countries as a group, and developing countries as a group, as the tiered formulas used. Anderson, Martin 









potential gains from reductions in market access barriers (which they estimate are responsible for all 
but one-tenth of the total potential benefits of freeing the world’s agricultural markets). 
The base from which reductions in domestic support will take place is the commitments on 
total bound Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) agreed under Article 6 of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture. The July Framework proposes tiered reductions in the total bound AMS, 
with larger reductions by Members with higher initial AMS levels. In addition, it proposes capping 
product-specific AMS; and de minimis levels are to be reduced to an extent to be negotiated.  
For modelling purposes we consider the implications of various degrees of cut in the Total 
Bound AMS on the actual distorting assistance that could be provided. A striking feature of the 
findings is that extraordinarily large reductions in bound AMS levels are required to bring about 
sizeable reductions in actual support -- an outcome required by paragraph 9 of the Framework. A 
tiered formula in which all countries with AMS notifications above 20 percent of the value of 
production cut their bound protection by 75 percent, and all others by 60 percent, bring about 
reductions in applied rates for only four WTO members: the US, the EU, Norway and Australia, as 
specified below. 
 
Agricultural export subsidies 
Farm export subsidies are inconsistent with GATT rules and for that reason alone deserve to 
be eliminated. The empirical analysis summarized in Hertel and Keeney (2005) shows that they are 
now only a small part of agricultural support programs: even when implicit subsidies in the form of 
food aid and export credits are included, they would be responsible for less than 5 percent of the 








subsidies is assumed in the scenarios considered below. Their elimination in isolation could harm a 
few food-importing and aid-dependent developing countries, but the poor in those countries can be 
assisted in far more efficient ways than via these measures.  
 
Non-agricultural market access (NAMA) 
Negotiations in the area of non-agricultural tariffs had barely begun by early 2005. There 
has been a clear indication that, with NAMA as with agricultural market access, developing 
countries can commit to lesser cust and longer phase-in periods and that least developed countries 
need not make any market-opening commitments. A Doha round is unlikely to involve non-
agricultural bound tariffs being cut by more than 50 percent, so we assume that degree of cut by 
high-income countries and 33 percent by developing countries other than least developed ones 
(from whom no cuts are being demanded). However, since that bound cut may lead to very little 
reform by developing countries, given their high tariff bindings relative to their applied tariffs, a 
more ambitious scenario may see them prepared to commit to more reform in order to entice further 
cuts in high-income countries’ agricultural and textiles tariffs. Perhaps the most optimistic 
possibility is that all developing (including least developed) countries agree to cut non-agricultural 
bound tariffs as much as high-income countries, that is, by 50 percent. Especially if that were 
coupled with similarly more-ambitious cuts in agricultural tariffs, high-income countries could well 








including as compensation to developing countries for losses arising from preference erosion and 
the removal of export subsidies.
13  
WTO members have been very slow in coming forward with proposals to reform services 
trade. It is conceivable that, as with the Uruguay Round, countries will make few meaningful 
commitments to open up their services sectors during the Doha round. For that reason, and because 
trade policies are less-adequately represented in trade models for services than for goods, we 
assume there will be no barrier reductions in this sector resulting from the Doha round – despite the 
fact that, as indicated in Hertel and Keeney (2005) and Winters et al. (2003), gains from services 
reform could well be enormous, including for developing countries.   
 
Possible Doha scenarios 
What will the Doha package ultimately contain? We assume there are no new trade 
facilitation measures, that agricultural export subsidies are eliminated, and that actual domestic 
support for agriculture is cut from 2001 levels in just four economies: by an average of 28 percent 
for the U.S., 18 percent for Norway, 16 percent for the EU and 10 percent for Australia. For 
agricultural market access we assume the tiered formula cut (described above) which brings down 
the average agricultural tariffs for developed countries as a group by 44 percent, and for developing 
countries as a group by 21 percent, with zero agricultural tariff cuts for least developed countries. 
Those reforms are first considered in isolation, as Scenario 1. We then add to Scenario 1 the cuts in 
non-agricultural tariff bindings of 50 percent in high-income countries, 33 percent in developing 
                                                 
13   The experience of earlier multilateral trade negotiations has shown that developing countries tended to receive 
greater market access only to the extent they are willing to give ‘concessions’, that is open up themselves, such is 
the reciprocal nature of these negotiations. See Finger (1974, 1976) for results from the Dillon and Kennedy 








countries, and zero in least developed countries to obtain Scenario 2. Finally, Scenario 3 makes 
developing (including least developed) countries full participants in the round, undertaking the same 
reductions in bound (but not necessarily applied) tariffs as the high-income countries in Scenario 2. 
The average tariffs resulting from all these scenarios are summarized in Table 11 for the 
three SSA sub-regions and for high-income and developing countries as group, along with the 
projected 2015 tariffs that would prevail without any further reform. What is clear is that, even in 
Scenario 3 in which all developing countries fully participate by cutting their bound tariffs as much 
as high-income countries, SSA would reduce their applied tariffs only a little. 
 
5. Estimated welfare, market and poverty effects of three Doha scenarios as of 2015 
The welfare consequences of implementing these various reforms over the 2005-2010 period 
and allowing the global economy to adjust to 2015 are summarized in Table 12 in both dollar terms 
and as percentage changes in real income in 2015. Column 1 suggests that agricultural liberalization 
using the tiered formula (Scenario 1) would generate a global gain of $75 billion even without the 
inclusion of non-agricultural tariff reform. But almost all those benefits accrue to the reforming 
high-income countries (with whom we include farm-protective Korea and Taiwan even though their 
farm reforms are only two-thirds as large as for other high-income countries) such that developing 
countries excluding Korea and Taiwan would gain only $9 billion because their bound tariffs are so 
high as to lead to almost no reform by them.  
Three variants of Scenario 1 were explored to see how much the agricultural reform results 
for SSA vary with changes in assumptions. First, were high-income countries allowed to exclude 








of their ‘Sensitive’ and ‘Special’ farm products), those global gains would shrink from $75 billion 
to just $18 billion, and SSA economies as a group would be no better instead of slightly better off. 
Second, were high-income countries not to reduce domestic support to their farmers, SSA’s welfare 
gain would shrink from 0.10 to 0.05 percent. And third, were high-income countries not to reduce 
farm export subsidies, SSA’s welfare gain would increase from 0.10 to 0.23 percent (see details in 
Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2005a). 
Scenarios 2 and 3 add non-agricultural tariff cuts to the agricultural reforms in the preceding 
scenarios. In Scenario 2, where Special and Differential Treatment is provided for developing 
countries’ non-agricultural cuts (as is the case for agricultural cuts), the gain nearly doubles for SSA 
countries as a group by adding these non-farm reforms, relative to Scenario 1 where only 
agriculture is cut. In Scenario 3, the developing and least developed countries fully engage in the 
Doha reform process, foregoing the opportunity to make lesser cuts as provided for in Scenarios 1 
and 2. That boosts SSA welfare considerably more, although even then their bound tariff cuts do not 
lead to much in the way of cuts to applied tariffs (see Table 11). Within SSA, the gains vary with 
the depth of actual tariff cuts: South Africa gains most, then Other Southern African countries, then 
the Rest of SSA so long as it participates more fully in reform (otherwise it loses very slightly). 
The real income gain to SSA in Scenario 3 in percentage terms is almost the same as for 
developing countries as a whole, namely 0.27 percent. This is so -- despite SSA cutting its applied 
tariffs less than other developing countries – because SSA economies are more distorted at the 
outset (Table 11). SSA gains almost certainly could be greater if the region was to choose 








suffered either as net food importers or as recipients of tariff preferences that have eroded with the 
decline in high-income countries’ MFN tariffs. 
How big would be the consequences of reform for SSA agriculture over the implementation 
period post-2004? Table 7 shows what that annual farm output and employment growth to 2015 
would be in the baseline (no policy changes post-2004), what it would be if all distortions to 
merchandise trade were removed globally, and what it would be under Doha Scenario 2. Table 8 
provides similar comparisons for food and agriculture’s share of GDP, and the proportion of the 
sector’s output that is exported. Clearly that Doha scenario would take SSA agriculture and farm 
households some distance towards where they would be under global free trade in all 
merchandise.
14 As with full reform, the relatively small percentage changes in net national 
economic welfare from partial reform hide the fact that redistributions of welfare among groups 
within each country can be much larger. In particular, real returns to farm land and unskilled labor 
would rise by more than rewards to other factors, hinting that at least these Doha scenarios 
(involving significant cuts in agricultural protection) would improve equity and reduce poverty in 
SSA as a region.
15 
The consequences of Scenario 2 for SSA trade patterns are summarized in Table 13. They 
show the region’s overall export increase of $1.2 billion per year by 2015 would comprise an 
increase of $2.6 billion in agricultural and processed food exports and a decrease of $1.4 billion in 
other merchandise exports. Only half of that increase in farm products would go to high-income 
                                                 
14   That is less the case for employment than for output. This finding of only small intersectoral labor movements in 
response to partial trade reform is consistent with econometric evidence of adjustments to past trade reforms (see, 
e.g., Wacziarg and Wallack 2004). 
15   To determine the poverty impacts in individual countries there is no substitute for detailed national analysis using 
models with various types of households explicitly represented. That is the purpose of the forthcoming volume by 
Hertel and Winters (2005), in which separate chapters are devoted to three SSA countries (Cameroon, Mozambique 








countries; the rest is split one-third to other SSA countries and two-thirds to developing countries in 
other regions. Exports of other merchandise to non-SSA developing countries also expand, so that 
overall this Doha scenario would see SSA exports being redirected from high-income to developing 
countries -- but with no net increase in trade within SSA because of its modest reforms in this 
scenario. On the import side, there is a slight increase in food imports but only from developing 
countries, while the opposite is true for other merchandise imports as all countries specialize more 
in what they do best. Notice from the final two columns of Table 13 that this scenario boosts SSA 
trade by only a small fraction of what would happen with full global liberalization.  
The impact of reform on the various product markets within Sub-Saharan Africa is 
summarized in Table 14. Doha Scenario 2 would change domestic consumption of most products by 
only a small fraction of 1 percent. Production and exports would change somewhat more, with 
cotton, sugar, meat and (from a small base) dairy products being the main expanding industries. Self 
sufficiency (production as a percentage of domestic consumption) would rise for virtually all 
agricultural and food products, but the rise is small. Under full liberalization, by contrast, SSA 
would specialize somewhat more within the agricultural sector, causing some self-sufficiency ratios 
to be higher and others lower.  
Finally, consider the critical issue of poverty. Assessing reform impacts on poverty with a 
global model could be seen as somewhat heroic. Yet despite the aggregate nature of the model, it 
nonetheless contains quite a bit of information from which it is possible to make some judgment 
about the possible changes in poverty. The simplest approach is to take the growth in real income, 
apply an estimated income-to-poverty elasticity, and assess the impacts on the headcount index. 








real income as the average household in the economy.
16 A somewhat more detailed approach is to 
link key model variables to the possible change in the average per capita consumption of the poor, 
that is, to capture from model results some distributional aspects of the changes in real income and 
not simply the average gain. We have done this by calculating the change in the real wage of 
unskilled workers, deflating it by a food/clothing consumer price index which is presumably more 
relevant for the poor than the total price index. While these simple calculations are not a substitute 
for more-detailed individual country case study analysis using detailed household surveys as in, for 
example, Hertel and Winters (2005), they are able to give a broad region-wide indication. 
Table 15 summarizes the key results from the global full liberalization scenario and some of 
the three Doha alternatives. Under the full merchandise trade liberalization scenario, extreme 
poverty in developing countries would drop by 32 million in 2015 relative to the baseline level of 
622 million, a reduction of 5 percent. The majority of the poor by 2015 are projected to be in SSA, 
and there the reduction would be 6 percent. With real incomes climbing by only 0.9 percent, this 
would seem to imply a relatively high poverty to income elasticity. However, recall that in our 
calculations, we base our poverty calculations on the change in the real wage of unskilled workers 
deflated by the food and clothing consumer price index. The average change in the real unskilled 
wage over all developing countries is 3.6 percent, or four times greater than the average income 
increase. Critically, we are assuming that the change in unskilled wages is fully passed through to 
households. Also, while the model closure has the loss in tariff revenues replaced by a change in 
                                                 
16  The World Bank’s headcount index forecast is derived from an estimated Lorenz curve based on the most recently 
available household survey and not from an elasticity approach. A forecast of the growth of per capita consumption 
is plugged into the Lorenz curve based functional form for the headcount index—assuming distribution neutrality. 








direct household taxation, the poverty calculation assumes that these increases only affect skilled 
workers and high-income households—a realistic assumption in many developing countries.
17  
Under the Doha scenarios reported in Table 15, the poverty impacts are far more modest. 
The number of poor living on $1/day or less would fall by 2.5 million in the case of the core Doha 
Scenario 2 (of which 0.5 million are in SSA) and by 6.3 million in the case of Doha Scenario 3 (of 
which 2.2  million are in SSA). This corresponds to the relatively modest ambitions of the 
merchandise trade reforms as captured in these Doha scenarios. If only agriculture was reformed 
(Doha Scenario 1) there would be much less poverty alleviation globally and none at all in SSA. 





Results such as those presented above are always dependent on the assumptions, data and 
parameters underlying them and so are subject to numerous qualifications. One that is particularly 
important to highlight has to do with the way preferences are treated in the Version 6 GTAP 
database. In previous versions of that database, only key reciprocal preferences were included, 
whereas the new Version 6 added non-reciprocal tariff preferences provided by high-income 
countries for their imports from developing countries under numerous arrangements such as the 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), the EU’s provisions for former colonies under the 
Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) program and more recently for least developed countries under 
                                                 
17   Even if the fiscal closure affects a domestic sales or value added tax instead of direct taxes on households, in many 
countries food, at least, is typically exempt from taxation, or the tax is difficult in practice to collect because of the 








the Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement, and likewise the US’s Africa Growth and Opportunity 
Act (AGOA) and Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). In preparing this new database, CEPII made the 
assumption that there are no rules of origin (ROOs) or the like which discourage developing 
countries from taking full advantage of those preferences (even though we know ROOs often lead 
to underutilization); and we assume perfect competition between traders in the two sets of countries, 
which determines how rents from those preferences are shared between the exporting and importing 
countries (even though we know the high-income country importers often have more market power 
than the developing country exporters of standard commodities such that the latter receives a 
smaller share of the rents than our analysis generates).
18 We therefore overstate the extent of 
preference erosion that would occur for especially least developed countries, and so understate the 
gains to SSA from trade reform. If instead those non-reciprocal preferences were excluded from the 
database, we would overestimate SSA gains from high-income country trade reform.
19 The 
difference is not expected to be great though: CEPII staff ran a scenario similar to our Doha 
Scenario 1, using their global Mirage model, and got very similar real income results for SSA with 
preferences included and only slightly higher gains (0.2 instead of 0.1 percent) when non-reciprocal 
preferences were excluded from the protection database (Bouet, Fontagne and Jean 2005, Table 
6.9). 
                                                 
18   Evidence that the preference margin is often eroded by complex rules of origin, and that the rent is shared between 
importing and exporting countries with the latter getting less the more trade is concentrated on standard 
commodities, can be found in Olarreaga and Ozden (2004) and Ozden and Sharma (2004). A recent partial 
equilibrium study found that in practice export revenue losses from preference erosion are likely to be limited to a 
small subset of countries, primarily small island economies dependent on exports of sugar, bananas and, to a far 
lesser extent, textiles (Alexandraki and Lankes 2004). 
19    A further complication is that the ACP non-reciprocal preference scheme is to be replaced from 2008 with 








  Another important caveat worth stressing is that the above results do not incorporate the fact 
that trade reform typically boosts factor productivity.
20 If instead we were to assume productivity is 
positively related to changes in sectoral openness (exports as a share of output), as specified in 
World Bank (2002), then the estimated global gains from freeing merchandise trade increase by 38 
percent. More importantly, they increase by 44 percent for middle-income countries and by 155 
percent for low-income countries, because the initial protection rates are so much higher there. For 
this reason much more than because of our treatment of preferences, the welfare effects presented in 
this paper should be taken as very much lower-bound estimates. This is especially so if high-income 
countries were to compensate least developed countries for preference erosion and that assistance 
were to be directed toward trade facilitation investments such as transport infrastructure (see 
below). 
  The above analysis does not include costs of adjustment to reform, but these are typically far 
less than commonly assumed.
21 Indeed, the structural changes that take place over time in the 
normal course of economic growth are shown above to be typically very much larger than the small 
additional changes that would accompany gradual and partial trade liberalization. Furthermore, 
adjustment assistance schemes (financed by foreign aid in the case of low-income countries) are a 
way to help fund adjustment to trade reform – and they are just one-off payments, whereas the costs 
of not reforming continue into the future. 
 
7. Summary and policy implications  
                                                 
20   See footnote 2 above. 
21   For a review of the empirical literature supporting this view for a range of countries, see Anderson (2004, pp. 560-
62). As mentioned earlier, adjustment would be even easier if there were some unskilled workers underemployed in 









  Several findings in the above results are worth reiterating. First is that moving to free global 
merchandise trade not only would boost real incomes in developing countries, and especially in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, but it would do so proportionately more than in high-income countries. This is 
true even for SSA other than southern Africa, whose economies would suffer a terms of trade loss 
in part because of a loss due to preference erosion (and despite us overstating the degree of tariff 
preference currently enjoyed by these countries). 
Second, agricultural reform is crucial for reaping those gains: it accounts for nearly two-
thirds of the potential benefits both for developing and developed countries. 
Third, reform by developing countries themselves is as important for their gains, and in 
agriculture as much as in manufactures, as is reform by high-income countries.  
Fourth, farm employment, the real value of agricultural output and exports, the real returns 
to farm land and unskilled labor, and real net farm incomes would all rise substantially in capital-
scarce SSA countries with a move to free merchandise trade. Given that more than two-thirds of 
SSA households are heavily dependent either directly or indirectly on agriculture for their 
livelihood, and that they and other unskilled laborers make up most of the people in poverty, there is 
a good chance that such a reform would improve equity and reduce poverty in all three sub-regions 
of SSA. And this is indeed what shows up in terms of the change in poverty headcount for the 
region using the simple income-to-poverty elasticity approach. 
And fifth, a Doha partial liberalization of merchandise trade could take SSA some way 
towards those desirable outcomes, but more so the more the region itself reduces its tariff binding 








the scenarios considered above, SSA gains proportionately as much as other developing countries in 
economic welfare terms. This is despite cutting its applied tariffs less, and is because its own trade 
distortions are larger than those of other developing countries. 
SSA gains could be greater if the region chose unilaterally to liberalize more, so as to get 
greater efficiency gains to offset the terms of trade losses suffered either as net food importers or as 
recipients of tariff preferences that have eroded with the decline in high-income countries’ MFN 
tariffs. 
  Clearly, agricultural reforms need to be significant if the Doha agreement is to be pro-
development and pro-poor. Outlawing agricultural export subsidies is the obvious first step. That 
will bring agriculture into line with the basic GATT rule against such measures, and in the process 
help to limit the extent to which governments encourage agricultural production by other means 
(since it would raise the cost of surplus disposal). Concurrently, domestic support bindings must be 
cut hugely to reduce binding overhang. In so doing, the highest-subsidizing countries, namely the 
EU, US and Norway, need to reduce their support not just for the sake of their own economies, but 
also to encourage SSA and other developing countries to reciprocate by opening their markets as a 
quid pro quo. Even more importantly, agricultural tariff bindings must be cut substantially before 
some genuine market opening can occur. Exempting even just a few ‘Sensitive’ and ‘Special’ 
products could reduce hugely the gains from reform, since they are likely to be the tariff peak items 
(although if their binding tariff rate quotas expand more so as a consequence, this could limit the 
diminution at least for those exporters lucky enough to have in-quota access). Expanding non-
agricultural market access at the same time as reforming agriculture is equally important for SSA. 








needs to be more than just textiles and clothing (which also benefit developing countries 
disproportionately) even though they are the other highly distorted sector.  
  South-South “concessions” also are needed for developing countries to get the most out of 
the Doha round. This means developing countries should reconsider the provisions in the July 2004 
framework agreement allowing them lesser cuts and a slower phase-in of reforms. Since developing 
countries are trading so much more with each other now, they are the major beneficiaries of reforms 
by other developing countries. Even SSA’s least developed countries should consider reducing their 
tariff binding overhang, since doing that in the context of Doha gives them more scope to demand 
“concessions” from richer countries than if they hang on to that aspect of Special and Differential 
Treatment.
22   
In conclusion, and in answer to the question posed in the paper’s title, it appears SSA 
economies could indeed gain from full multilateral trade reform. Of the partial liberalizations 
considered above, South Africa and even more so other countries in southern Africa would gain, 
while the Rest of SSA is estimated to lose slightly because few countries in that sub-region cut their 
applied tariffs in those Doha scenarios (even when they fully participate, such is the extent of their 
binding overhang). However, the poorest people in SSA, namely farmers and unskilled laborers, 
appear likely to gain most from global trade liberalization. To realize more of their potential gains 
from trade, SSA countries would need to forego some of the Special and Differential Treatment 
they have previously demanded in terms of making lesser tariff cuts, and perhaps also commit to 
additional unilateral trade (and complementary domestic) reforms, and to invest more in trade 
facilitation. High-income countries could encourage them to do so by being willing to open up their 
                                                 
22    While no extra market access results immediately from just reducing (as distinct from eliminating) binding 
overhang, it is nonetheless capable of doing so in the longer term as market conditions change (Francois and Martin 








own markets more to developing country exports in response to greater opening by developing 
countries, and by providing more targeted aid.
23 
To that end, new proposals have been put forward to reward developing country 
commitments to greater trade reform with an expansion of trade-facilitating aid, to be provided by a 
major expansion of the current Integrated Framework, which is operated by a consortium of 
international agencies for least developed countries (Hoekman 2004, 2005). This may well provide 
an attractive path for developing countries seeking to trade their way out of poverty through 
expanding exports to take advantage of new market openings. Making the aid flow commensurate 
with the degree to which a developing country is willing to commit to opening its own market is not 
only consistent with current practices of international financial institution to focus assistance in 
countries willing to reform. As well, it would help offset the tendency for an expanded aid flow to 
cause a real exchange rate appreciation that could otherwise thwart efforts to expand exports (see 
Commission for Africa 2005, pp. 296-97). Moreover, this is potentially a far more efficient way for 
developed countries to assist people in low-income countries than the current systems of tariff 
preferences.     
                                                 
23   In that process, high-income countries would be rewarded economically: Table 5 shows high-income countries 
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Appendix: Comparison of LINKAGE model results with those from the GTAP-AGR model 
 
Using the same GTAP Version 6.0 2001 database, our analysis using the LINKAGE model 
provides considerably larger welfare gains from full trade liberalization than generated by Hertel 
and Keeney (2005) using a variant on the standard GTAP model called GTAP-AGR. To understand 
the reasons behind this difference, we altered the LINKAGE model so that it mimics the comparative 
static GTAP-AGR model as of 2001, and then we also altered assumptions about elasticities and 
factor mobility to make them similar to those used by Hertel and Keeney. 
Obtaining a comparative static version of the LINKAGE model involves only a few 
modifications to the recursive dynamic version. Specifically, the ‘new’ elasticities of substitution in 
production are imposed to mimic the long-term properties of the dynamic model, capital is assumed 
to be perfectly mobile, and adjustment costs are ignored. But the big difference between the 
comparative static and dynamic version results is the change in the structure of the global economy 
by 2015, due to growth in factor stocks and changes in the relative weights of countries and sectors 
in the global economy over those 14 years.  
Table A reports what the LINKAGE model says is the welfare cost of global trade barriers and 
agricultural subsidies in 2001 under differing assumptions, as compared with their cost in 2015. 
First, by scaling the 2015 dynamic results back to 2001 by assuming the percentage effect on 
income in each region is the same in 2001 as in 2015 reduces the real global cost from $278 billion 
to $150 billion – simply because each regional economy is smaller. Second, when the dynamic 








the long-run Armington elasticities
24 used in the LINKAGE model (which we believe are more 
appropriate for the long-run analysis being undertaken in the current study) are replaced be the 
medium-term ones used in Hertel and Keeney’s GTAP-AGR model,
25 the real global cost shrinks 
further to $82 billion. In short, those three differences between the two models almost fully explain 
the different aggregate results, since that $82 billion is very close to Hertel and Keeney’s $84 billion 
comparative static estimate of the gains from freeing merchandise trade globally. One other 
difference between the LINKAGE and GTAP models has to do with agricultural land: GTAP assumes 
a fixed supply of farm land and limited land mobility between farm sectors whereas the LINKAGE 
model assumes farm land supply in the long run is somewhat responsive to farm product prices and 
that there is complete mobility of that land among farming enterprises in the long run.
26 The final 
column of Table A shows that replacing those two assumptions with the ones adopted in the GTAP-
AGR model does almost nothing to the global cost of trade-distorting policies, although the 
distribution of those costs is somewhat different. 
                                                 
24   These elasticities represent the top-level Armington elasticity, i.e. between domestic demand and aggregate import 
demand. The second-level Armington elasticity, i.e. across trading partners, is set at twice the top-level elasticity. 
25   The new GTAP elasticities are the outcome of significant econometric work and are higher than the standard 
Armington elasticities used in previous releases of GTAP. While recognizing the extensive work behind the new 
elasticities, the controversy underlying these key parameters continues. The new GTAP elasticities reflect a move 
towards mid-range Armington elasticities, but are still much lower than those used by some, notably Tarr and 
Rutherford and their associates. The LINKAGE model elasticities are above those in GTAP-AGR but still in the mid-
range, and are the outcome of literature surveys, best guesses and adjustments that have been undertaken over a 15-
year period since the inception of the LINKAGE model and its predecessors. The difference between these 
elasticities for each good is detailed in Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2005a, Appendix Table 
A12.4). 
26    In the standard LINKAGE model, an upward-sloping supply function is implemented for land, with supply 
elasticities higher for land-abundant countries than for land-scarce countries. There is also perfect land mobility 
across farm enterprises. In the final simulation the supply elasticity is set to 0 and the land transformation elasticity 








Table 1: Average applied import tariffs, by sector and region, 2001 







     Agriculture and food 
 
High-income countries
b  16 11
Developing countries
a  18 13
      South Africa  92
      Other Southern
c Africa  12 11
      Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  21 15





a  17 10
      South Africa  22 9
      Other Southern
c Africa  13 6
      Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  26 8
  Other manufactures 
  
High-income countries
b  1.3 0.4
Developing countries
a  87
      South Africa  50 . 2
      Other Southern
c Africa  86
      Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  14 6
 
  All merchandise 
 
High-income countries
b  3 3
Developing countries
a  10 8
      South Africa  7 1
      Other Southern
c Africa  9 7
      Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  16 9
a These import-weighted averages incorporate tariff preferences provided to developing countries, 
unlike earlier versions of the GTAP database. 
b High-income countries include the newly industrialized East Asian customs territories of Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as well as the European transition economies that joined the 
EU in April 2004. 
c Botswana, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. These 
countries accounted for 14 percent of Sub-Saharan African GDP in 2001 (while South Africa 
accounted for 36 percent and the Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 50 percent. 









Table 2: Impacts on real income and on the volume and terms of 
trade from full liberalization of global merchandise trade, 2015 
(Impacts in 2015 relative to the baseline, in 2001 $ and percent))        



















High-income countries  202 (30)  0.6  0.6  5 
        
Developing countries  86 (-29)  0.8  -0.6  20 
        
    Sub-Saharan Africa  4.8 (-1.8)  1.1  -0.7  23 
       South Africa  1.3  (0.0)  0.9  0.4  16 
       Other Southern Africa  1.0  (0.5)  1.5  2.7  17 
       Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  2.5 (-2.3)  1.1  -1.9  27 
        
        
World total  287  0.7  0.0  9 
 
a Numbers in parentheses show the amount due to changes in the terms of trade 
 








Table 3: Value of exports net of imports of agricultural and processed food products, actual 




  2001 2015
baseline
2015 full trade 
liberalization
    Sub-Saharan Africa  61 9 2 7
       South Africa  2 1 3
       Other Southern Africa  2 6 10












Table 4: Impact of full liberalization of global merchandise trade on indexes of real
a export 




                                                                      Export prices                                Import prices  











       
       South Africa  -0.6 -0.1 0.1 1.6  -0.3 -0.1
       Other Southern Africa  2.6 1.4 1.3 1.5  -0.6 -0.1
       Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  -1.4 -3.1 -2.2 3.7  -0.1 -0.1
 
 
a Relative to the numeraire which in this version of the LINKAGE model is the price of high-income 
countries’ exports of manufactures. 
 
 









Table 5: Regional and sectoral source of gains from full liberalization of global 
merchandise trade by developing and high-income countries, 2015 
(Change in real income in 2015 relative to baseline scenario) 
        
  Gains by region in $billion  Percent of global
a gain 











        
Developing countries liberalize:           
Agriculture and food  27 15 42 9  5  15  (35) 
Textile and wearing apparel  9 14 24 3  5  8  (11) 
Other merchandise  6 52 58 2 18 20(14) 
All sectors  45 80  126 16 28 44(60) 
           
High-income countries liberalize:           
Agriculture and food  26 107 133 9  37  46(43) 
Textile and wearing apparel  15 1  16 5 0 6(-0) 
Other merchandise  4 5 9 1 2 3(-3) 
All sectors  44 115 159 15  40  55(40) 
           
All countries liberalize:           
Agriculture and food  54 128 182 19  45  63(78) 
Textile and wearing apparel  22 16 38 8  6 13(11) 
Other merchandise  10 57 67 3 20 23(11) 
All sectors  86 202 287 30  70  100(100) 
a Numbers in parentheses are percentages of gains to Sub-Saharan Africa  











Table 6: Impacts of full global merchandise trade liberalization on real value of 
agricultural and food exports and output, and on real net agricultural 
incomes, 2015 
(Changes in 2015 values relative to baseline, 2001 $ billion and percent) 
         
  Ag & food output  Ag & food exports   Net farm income 
 $billion  Percent  $billion
a  Percent $billion Percent 
         
High-income countries  -204.7  -5  116 (-90)  16  -64.8  -17 
          
Developing countries  66.8  2  192 (90)  67  57.4  5 
          
   Sub Saharan Africa  2.6  2  16 (27)  48  5.9  9 
       South Africa  1.4  5  2 (3)  56  0.8  16 
       Other Southern Africa  5.3  9  5 (10)  50  1.8  11 
       Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  -4.1  -1  10 (14)  45  3.3  8 
          
World total  -137.8  -1  308 (0)  36  -7.4  -0 
 
a Exports net of imports shown in parentheses 
 










Table 7: Agricultural output and employment growth under different 
scenarios, 2004-2015 
(annual percent growth rate between 2004 and 2015) 
          






Doha Scenario 2 
    
(a) farm output growth          
Sub-Saharan Africa  4.5 4.9 4.7 
South Africa  2.5 3.3 2.6 
Other Southern Africa  5.3 5.7 5.4 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  4.6 4.8 4.8 
     
     
(b) farm employment growth     
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.3 2.6 2.4 
South Africa  0.0  0.8  0.1 
Other Southern Africa  3.0  3.3  3.0 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  2.2  2.5  2.3 
 










Table 8: Agriculture and food’s share of total GDP, and the share of 
its output that is exported, 2001 and 2015 
(percent)  
      
 Baseline Baseline  Full  lib’n 
Doha 
Scenario 2 
 2001  2015 
     
(a) Agric and food’s share of GDP     
      
High-income  countries  4.3 3.4 3.2 3.3 
      
Developing  countries  16.9 16.1 16.5 16.3 
      
   Sub-Saharan Africa  21.4 20.8 21.6 21.1 
      South Africa  7.9 6.8 7.4 6.9 
      Other Southern Africa  34.7 33.1 36.0 33.7 
      Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  27.0 26.6 26.9 26.9 
      
      
World  total  6.7 6.2 6.1 6.2 
      
(b) Share of ag and food output exported     
      
High-income  countries  11.1 12.3 14.8 12.5 
    (excluding intra-EU25  trade) 5.8  7.5 11.6  8.2 
      
Developing  countries  7.5 6.9  11.6 7.8 
      
   Sub-Saharan Africa  12.5 15.8 23.1 16.6 
      South Africa  16.0 12.7 18.8 13.5 
      Other Southern Africa  13.2 18.1 25.4 19.2 
      Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  11.2 15.8 23.3 16.5 
      
      
World  total  9.5  9.5 13.2 10.0 
    (excluding intra-EU25  trade) 6.6  7.2 11.6  8.0 
 










Table 9: Impacts of full global merchandise trade liberalization on real factor returns, 
2015
a 
(Percent change in real factor prices relative to the baseline in 2015) 





wages   Capital   
Farm 
land   CPI 
             
South Africa  2.8  2.5  1.8  5.7  -1.6 
Other Southern Africa  6.0 1.6  0.0  4.6  0.4 
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa  8.2 6.5  2.2  5.2  -5.0 
          
a. Nominal factor prices are deflated by the consumer price index (CPI). 
   









Table 10: Agricultural weighted average import tariffs, by region, 2001 
(percent, ad valorem equivalent, weights based on imports) 
 
  
  Bound tariff  MFN applied tariff  Actual applied tariff
a 
      
Developed countries  27  22  14 
Developing countries  48  27  21 
    of which: South Africa  52  14  13 
                   SSA LDCs  63  15  13 
                  Other SSA  105  27  26 
      
WORLD 37  24  17 
 
a Includes preferences and in-quota TRQ rates where relevant, as well as the ad valorem equivalent 
of specific tariffs. Developed countries include the transition economies of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. The ‘developing countries’ definition used here is that adopted by the WTO 
and so includes East Asia’s four newly industrialized economies. 
 










Table 11: Average applied tariffs for all goods, by country/region,  2015 baseline and 
under various partial Doha reform scenarios 
(percent) 
(a) Agricultural and food tariffs (%)             






Scenario 3           
                                                       
South  Africa    8.6 8.1 8.1 6.6           
Other Southern Africa    11.8  11.6  11.5  11.0           
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa    21.2  19.6  19.6  16.1           
                     
                  
All  developing  countries    14.2 12.5 12.4 10.6           
High-income  countries    15.9 8.4 8.2 7.5           
 
(b) Textile and clothing tariffs (%)               
South  Africa    21.9 21.9 17.4 13.2           
Other Southern Africa    12.5  12.5  12.4  12.2           
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa    26.2  26.2  25.9  24.6           
                     
                  
All  developing  countries    14.3 14.3 12.7 11.3           
High-income  countries    7.3 7.3 4.1 4.1           
 
(c) Other merchandise tariffs (%)               
South  Africa    5.4 5.4 5.1 4.2           
Other Southern Africa    7.5  7.5  7.3  7.4           
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa    14.0  14.0  14.0  13.7           
                     
                  
All  developing  countries    7.1 7.1 6.4 5.9           
High-income  countries    1.2 1.2 0.8 0.8           
 
(d) All merchandise trade tariffs (%)               
South  Africa    6.6 6.5 6.0 4.9           
Other Southern Africa    8.5  8.5  8.3  8.2           
Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa    16.3  16.0  15.9  15.0           
                     
                  
All  developing  countries    8.4 8.2 7.5 6.8           
High-income  countries    2.9 2.3 1.6 1.6           


















Scenario 3   
Full 
liberaliz’n
(a) in 2001 $billion compared to 
baseline              
              
High-income  countries       65.6 79.9 96.4    202 
             86 
Developing  countries        9.0 16.1 22.9     
              
   Sub Saharan Africa        0.3  0.4  1.2    4.8 
       South Africa        0.1  0.4  0.7    1.3 
       Other Southern Africa        0.1  0.1  0.2    1.0 
       Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa        0.0  -0.1  0.3    2.5 
                 
              
World total        74.5  96.1  119.3    287 
              
              
(b) percent change compared to 
baseline              
              
High-income countries       0.20 0.25 0.30    0.6 
              
Developing countries       0.09 0.16 0.22    0.8 
              
   Sub Saharan Africa        0.06  0.10  0.27    1.1 
       South Africa       0.06 0.25 0.49    0.9 
       Other Southern Africa       0.21 0.19 0.26    1.5 
       Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa       0.02 -0.02  0.13    1.1 
               
               
World  total       0.18 0.23 0.28    0.7 
 









Table 13: Change in SSA’s merchandise export and import trade patterns due to Doha 















Agriculture and food  1.4  0.4 0.8 2.6  18.5
Other merchandise  -1.7  -0.4 0.7 -1.4  15.0
All merchandise  -0.3  0.0 1.5 1.2  33.5
    
Import trade:    
    
Agriculture and food  -0.3  0.4 0.5 0.2  10.5
Other merchandise  0.8  -0.4 -0.1 0.7  22.5




Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations  
 
Table 14: Domestic output, exports, absorption and self-sufficiency, Sub Saharan Africa, 2015  
(Volume levels in 2015 in baseline, percent volume changes in 2015 in reform scenarios)   
                        












   Output Exports 
Domestic 
Consump.  Self-suff.  Output Exports 
Domestic 
Consump.  Self-suff.  Output Exports 
Domestic 
Consump.  Self-suff. 
                            
Rice  16,283  186  17,949  91  -21.5  39.1  -8.9  78  0.4  -6.6  0.1  91 
Wheat  1,910  68  3,601  53  -37.0  149.7  -5.6  35  5.2  15.6  -0.1  56 
Other grains  13,134  399  12,985  101  -0.8  44.1  -1.6  102  0.3  5.3  0.0  101 
Oil seeds  3,031  1,198  1,918  158  79.1  198.5  1.6  279  7.0  17.1  0.4  168 
Sugar  13,014  1,808  11,984  109  6.3  108.5  -0.1  116  14.9  95.2  2.1  122 
Plant-based fibers  4,962  3,863  1,287  385  52.8  72.9  -15.2  694  16.9  21.9  -0.7  454 
Vegetables and fruits  16,307  4,949  11,892  137  2.3  20.8  -0.5  141  -4.9  -15.5  0.2  130 
Other crops  32,126  14,197  19,232  167  2.6  10.7  -1.8  174  -1.9  -4.4  0.1  164 
Livestock  33,402  1,620  32,429  103  6.2  15.7  6.5  103  2.4  -3.6  2.7  103 
Other natural resources  34,469 7,677 27,619  125  0.2  2.9  -0.2  125  -1.2  -4.8  -0.3  124 
Fossil fuels  51,738 25,673  35,302  147  9.2  26.4  3.9  154  0.0  0.1  0.1  146 
Processed meats  14,118  828  14,730  96  42.2  791.7  -0.1  136  11.2  170.6  -0.3  107 
Vegetable oils and fats  4,620  489  5,416  85  -14.8  -22.7  0.8  72  -1.1  -13.7  0.3  84 
Dairy products  3,728  223  5,049  74  2.5  114.6  -3.0  78  10.7  70.5  -2.5  84 
Other food, beverages and tobacco  78,640  8,294  78,413  100  -6.6  14.0  1.1  93  -0.5  -3.6  0.5  99 
Textile  16,143 2,871 21,453  75  -19.3  8.0  -1.3  62  -3.3  -8.6  -0.7  73 
Wearing apparel  4,737 1,326  6,073  78 -9.1 44.6  14.2  62  -0.6  0.8  0.7  77 
Leather  4,440 874  5,243  85  -29.8  -4.8  1.1  59 -3.8  -7.7  -0.2  82 
Chemicals rubber and plastics  32,943 6,583 46,956  70 -4.2 22.3  1.7  66  -1.2  -4.1  0.1  69 
Iron and steel  8,639  4,435  9,171  94  -0.2  6.2 0.7 93 0.6  1.1 -0.3 95 
Motor vehicles and parts  12,486  3,739  21,372  58  27.8  144.1 9.4 68 3.0  7.3 0.8 60 
Capital goods  29,214  14,069  64,220  45  1.9  11.6 2.6 45 0.0  0.0 0.1 45 
Other manufacturing  98,868 35,055  86,303  115  -4.9  7.0  0.7  108  -1.6  -3.4  -0.2  113 
Construction  58,923  308  58,911  100  2.9  14.4  2.9  100  0.1  -0.6  0.2  100 
Utilities and services  411,242  25,806  413,333  99  0.4  5.0  -0.1  100  0.0  -0.5  0.1  99 
 
Source: Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations  
 
 
Table 15: Changes in poverty ( those earning <$1/day) in alternative Doha scenarios compared 
with full liberalization, 2015  
                   
    Full liberalization  Doha alternatives 
 
Base
line      
Doha 
Scenario 1   
Doha 
Scenario 2   
Doha 
Scenario 3   
                   
2015 Headcount (%)                          
East Asia & Pacific  0.9    0.8    0.9    0.9    0.9   
Latin America & Carib.  6.9    6.6    6.9    6.9    6.8   
South Asia  12.8    12.5    12.8    12.7    12.6   
Sub-Saharan Africa  38.4    36.0    38.4    38.3    38.1   
All developing countries  10.2   9.7    10.2    10.2    10.1   
                   
                   
2015 Headcount  
2015 
level 
Decrease from baseline 
in millions  Decrease from baseline in millions 
East Asia & Pacific  19    2.2    0.1    0.3    0.5   
Latin America & Carib.  43    2.1    0.3    0.4    0.5   
South Asia  216    5.6    0.2    1.4    3.0   
Sub-Saharan Africa  340    21.1    -0.1    0.5    2.2   
All developing countries  622    31.9    0.5    2.5    6.3   
 











Table A: Impacts on real incomes of full liberalization of global merchandise trade, by country/region, base 
case in 2015 versus comparative static cases in 2001           (Change in real income, $billion) 
  2015                2001     
    Base  Scaled Comparative  GTAP GTAP  elas+
   case  dynamics  static  elasticities  fixed land
             
Australia and New Zealand  6.1  3.5  2.2  1.8  1.7
EU 25 plus EFTA  65.2  45.3  44.0  32.9  30.2
United States  16.2  9.8  4.1  4.5  5.2
Canada  3.8  2.5  2.1  1.0  0.8
Japan  54.6  28.0  30.8  25.1  25.3
Korea and Taiwan  44.6  14.3  16.1  8.9  9.1
Hong Kong and Singapore  11.2  5.6  4.3  3.7  3.6
Argentina 4.9  2.9  1.7 1.1  0.8
Bangladesh 0.1  0.1  -0.2 -0.3  -0.4
Brazil 9.9  6.1  4.7 5.0  2.2
China 5.6  1.9  0.6 -0.5  -2.5
India 3.4  1.7  -0.8 -1.5  -0.8
Indonesia 1.9  1.0  0.2 0.1  -0.1
Thailand 7.7  3.7  2.1 1.4  0.9
Vietnam 3.0  1.6  1.1 0.7  0.7
Russia 2.7  1.4  2.0 1.6  1.4
Mexico 3.6  2.3  -0.4 -1.5  -1.5
South Africa  1.3  0.8  0.7 0.5  0.4
Turkey 3.3  1.7  1.3 0.9  0.9
Rest of South Asia  1.0  0.5  -0.2  -0.3  -0.3
Rest of East Asia  5.3  2.7  2.9  2.0  1.7
Rest of LAC  10.3  6.6  2.0  -0.6  -2.1
Rest of ECA  1.0  0.3  0.6  -0.2  -0.4
Middle East and North Africa  14.0  8.1  3.8  2.2  1.6
Selected SSA countries  1.0  0.6  0.3  0.4  0.3
Rest of Sub Saharan Africa  2.5  1.4  -0.2  -0.6  -0.8
Rest of the World  3.4  1.6  1.4  0.4  0.0
High-income countries  201.6  109.8  103.7 77.9  75.8
Developing countries  85.7  43.9  23.7 10.6  2.0
East Asia and Pacific  23.5  9.4  6.9  3.7  0.6
South Asia  4.5  2.2  -1.2  -2.1  -1.5
Europe and Central Asia  7.0  3.5  3.9  2.3  1.9
Middle East and North Africa  14.0  8.1  3.8  2.2  1.6
Sub Saharan Africa  4.8  2.8  0.7  0.2  -0.1
Latin America and the Caribbean  28.7  17.9  8.1  4.0  -0.5
World total  287.3  156.4  127.4  88.5  77.8
a The scaled dynamic results refer to the impact of global merchandise trade reform with limited reductions in some key agricultural 
sectors in Japan (rice and sugar) and Korea and Taiwan (rice, oil seeds and other grains). The percentage change in real income in 
each region in 2015 resulting from the dynamic simulation is scaled to the 2001 level of income for that region. 
Source:  Authors’ World Bank LINKAGE model simulations. 